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Abstract
How can agents in the military, who control the means of coercion, commit not to expropriate
from producers? In this paper we propose competition within the military as one of the
mechanisms that can deter predation and consequently create commitment. In our model,
even if agents within the military could expropriate all output costlessly, it is attractive to
protect producers from predating military units. This is because there is a marginal defensive
advantage and consequently defense is an effective way to potentially eliminate other military
units, reducing competition and leading to higher future payoffs. Our model predicts that
greater internal competition within the military lowers the risk of expropriation and that this
effect is strongest for countries with low institutional and economic development. Testing this
prediction empirically, we find a robust negative relationship between competition within the
military and expropriation risk. In line with our model this effect is strongest for countries at
lower stages of institutional and economic development, and it weakens as the latter improve.
These results indicate that there may be a short-run component to property rights institutions
that varies with the degree of competition among agents who control the means of coercion.
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1 Introduction
The enforcement of property rights and contractual agreements ultimately depends on the
presence of agents, such as the police or the military, who can use coercive power to punish
those who violate them. But how can these agents commit not to abuse this power for their
own gain? This commitment is important since the possibility of ex-post expropriation would
seriously undermine incentives for ex-ante investments leading to poor economic outcomes.
Our answer to this question of “who guards the guards themselves?” is that “the guards
guard each other”, that is, competition between agents in the military and in particular,
their inability to commit not to turn against one another, keeps predatory behaviour at bay.
In our model, even if these agents could expropriate all output costlessly, it is attractive to
protect producers from predators. This is because there is a marginal defensive advantage and
consequently defense is an effective way to potentially eliminate competitors since a reduction
in competition leads to higher future payoffs. Producers can therefore engineer a Prisoner’s
dilemma that exploits the desire of agents with coercive power to get rid of competitors, to
threaten potential predators with elimination.
Using this basic mechanism we find a negative relationship between short-run expropria-
tion risk and the number of specialists in violence2. We interpret this as a mechanism through
which we may expect competition between specialists in violence to reduce expropriation risk.
Embedding this mechanism in a richer model with occupational choice, and a public goods
role for the specialists in violence we find that this negative relationship is decreasing in mag-
nitude in the level of long run institutional and economic development as the relative payoff
of production increases as improved institutions increase the costs of predation.
We test this model using a panel of 168 countries over 11 years. Controlling for country
and year fixed effects, we find a robust negative relationship between the short-run risk of
expropriation and the number of military units in a country. In line with the predictions of
our model we find that this effect attenuates in the level of long run institutional quality.
In particular we find that the negative relationship predicted by our model is significant
for countries below the 30th percentile of institutional development and becomes weaker for
countries with higher institutional quality.
Our paper contributes to the large literature in economics and political science that at-
tempts to explain the existence of the commitment by those who have power to expropriate.
The dominant view in the literature on this issue is the one laid out in the seminal work
of Olson (1993), who argued that as a specialist in violence faces fewer threats from com-
petitors and becomes more entrenched, his incentives for full expropriation decrease, leading
to reduced predation. Hence commitment by the specialist in violence arises as a result of
his need to stimulate private investments in order to maximise revenue.3 Our model departs
2We follow North et al. (2009) in using this term to refer to agents with control of coercive power.
3This idea was formalised in McGuire and Olson (1996) and Grossman and Noh (1990). It is interesting to note
that the problem of commitment becomes salient only in economies where output depends on ex-ante invetments.
In a pure exchange economy the ability to commit is irrelevant since the equilibrium is likely to be pareto efficient
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from the Olsonian view in two ways.
First, the Olsonian insight works only in an infinitely repeated setting. If the game is
only finitely repeated then the result unravels through backwards induction and we are left
with full predation and consequently no investment in equilibrium, regardless of the number
of specialists in violence. In the Olsonian setting, an infinitely repeated game allows the pro-
ducers and specialists in violence to use trigger strategies to support equilibria characterized
by high investment and low expropriation. However in an infinitely repeated setting it is
unclear why increasing the number of specialists in violence increases predation since it may
be possible for producers to play trigger strategies that allow low predation to be sustained
even with a large number of specialists in violence. Rather than taking it for granted that
more specialists in violence leads to more conflict and lower investment, we supply explicit
micro-foundations for the interaction between many specialists in violence. In doing so we
also show that it is possible to sustain less than full predation in a one-shot setting.
Second, our paper is inspired by the fact that some real world institutional arrangements
seem at odds with this Olsonian view and are predicated on the commonly held belief that
diffusion of power is good. For example, in order to avoid collusion leading to abuses of their
power, there are often strict protocols governing the manner in which the highest ranks of
the military meet.4 Another famous historical example, which we deal with in more detail
in section A.1 in the appendix, comes from the Roman Republic, where ultimate power
over the army was typically vested in two consuls with a view to keep a check on their
power. This idea of checks and balances lies at the heart of our model, where the presence
of several military units keeps each one in check creating a balance of power conducive to
investments.5 The insight that we formalise here is that commitment should not be seen as an
additional strategy that may or may not be available to these agents as a result of exogenous
institutional arrangements.6 Instead, we argue that commitment should be seen as a feature
even with predation since there are no incentive effects. Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) present a model that makes
this point formally.
4Our paper is related to Besley and Robinson (2010), who model the interaction between the military and civilian
government when there is the possibility of the former seizing power through a coup. In their model, a key concern
is the ability of the government to commit to pay the military, whereas our focus is on the commitment of the
military. Furthermore, a major difference is that in our model agents within the military can collude to expropriate
fully without incurring any costs.
5Acemoglu et al. (2009) is another paper which incorporates some aspects of our model, in that it features
elimination (through voting, rather than fighting) of competitors that can potentially be a threat in future rounds
of elimination. They analyse the conditions under which a military junta would degenerate into personal rule. They
find that stable coalitions emerge only if the game between the members of the junta is infinitely repeated and the
members have a high enough discount factor. In contrast in our model, we will find that it is possible to maintain
a unique stable coalition of specialists in violence all of whom side with the producers, even in a one shot setting.
6The mechanism at play in our model is reminiscent of Dal Bo´ (2007), where a lobbyist can affect the outcome
of a vote by a committee by offering members transfers which compensate voters for voting against their own
preferences only when they are pivotal. Since this makes voting according to the wishes of the lobbyist a dominant
strategy, the compensatory transfers are never paid out. The analogue idea in our model is that producers need
to pay the specialists in violence only their payoff when they are the sole predator fighting against all others, i.e.,
when they are pivotal in predation, making this “bribe” small. On the other hand, our paper does not assume the
existence of any kind of contract enforcement, which is required in Dal Bo´ (2007).
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of an equilibrium arising from a game played between more than one specialists in violence.
The empirical findings in our paper are complementary to the research agenda that seeks
to identify the long-run determinants and effects of institutions (see for example, Efendic
et al. (2011) for a meta-analysis of the literature). This literature shows how variables such
as factor endowments (Engerman and Sokoloff (2000)), legal origins (Djankov et al. (2003)),
and colonial history (Acemoglu et al. (2001)) can explain long-run cross-country differences
in institutions and economic performance. Our findings suggest that in addition to the
time-invariant component of institutions that has been emphasised in this literature there
may also be a short-run component.7 Our results suggest that the short-run component of
expropriation risk can be explained partly through an “extractive” channel, that is the degree
of competition between specialists in violence who control coercive power.
In particular, the extractive mechanism we model is one where equilibrium expropriation
arises from the strategic interaction among players who have exclusive control of coercive
power. In line with the literature8, our model predicts that this mechanism is prominent at
lower levels of economic and institutional development. Our empirical results support this
idea and indicate that a greater degree of internal competition among specialists in violence
is associated with lower short-run expropriation risk but only in countries at a lower level
of development. As predicted by our model, this mechanism is empirically irrelevant in
developed countries.
As such, these results also contribute to the empirical literature on the relationship be-
tween the military and economic outcomes. Alptekin and Levine (2012) conduct a meta-
analysis of the results in this literature and find evidence in favor of a non-linear relationship
between military expenditure and economic growth. Our results support a non-linear rela-
tionship between the size of the military and expropriation risk that is mediated by long run
institutional quality.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the role of the military in non-democratic/au-
tocratic regimes and the effects of autocratic takeover on economic outcomes, such as Nan-
nicini and Ricciuti (2010). In contrast to Acemoglu et al. (2010) and Svolik (2013), who study
the role of the military as a repressive tool of an autocratic regime, we are more concerned
with the effect that the structure of the military has on investment incentives.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the baseline model with homoge-
neous agents and derives the comparative statics of the equilibrium. Section 2.4 extends the
baseline model to allow heterogeneity in the strength of each specialist in violence. Section
A.1 is a case study of a historical institution, namely consulship during the Roman Repub-
lic, which supports the intuition of our argument. Section 3 extends the model to allow for
occupation choice and public good provision by specialists in violence. This yields testable
implications that we take to the data in section 4. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
7One paper that uses short run fluctuations in institutions is Busse and Hefeker (2007) which estimates the effect
of institutions on foreign direct investment using fixed effects estimation.
8See for example North et al. (2009).
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2 Model
The economy is populated by an exogenously given number of producers and specialists in
violence. We can think of a specialist in violence as an individual soldier, endowed with some
strength, who unilaterally decides whether to predate or defend the producers. Alternately,
it is also possible to think about a specialist in violence as a military leader who commands
an independent military unit. This would be appropriate if we believe that the decision
to predate or defend is taken by a military leader whose soldiers simply act on his orders.
For different organisational forms within the military it may be appropriate to think of the
specialist in violence as the general, the colonel, or an individual soldier depending on who
makes the decision to predate or defend. At this stage we can remain agnostic about which
one of these is true.9 For now all specialists in violence are assumed to be of equal strength.
This assumption will be relaxed in section 2.4.
Producers operate a technology that requires some ex-ante investment in order to generate
output. We assume that specialisation is complete, so that producers cannot defend them-
selves against specialists in violence, whilst the latter cannot control the former’s investment
decisions.10 The interaction between these two groups is modelled as a game that unfolds as
follow.
Timing
1. Producers make investments.
2. Output is realised and producers choose a fraction t of total output to offer to each
specialist in violence.
3. Each specialist in violence independently chooses whether to predate or defend.
(a) If all specialists in violence choose to defend then each is paid the transfer t by the
producers and the game ends.
(b) If some specialists in violence choose to predate, there is a fight between predators
and defenders, with defeated specialists in violence obtaining a payoff of 0.
4. (a) If the predators win, they expropriate all output and they share it among them-
selves, since producers cannot fight back.
9We discuss the implications of cross country variation in the military organisational forms when we take the
model to the data in section 4.4 since this issue will be relevant in the empirics.
10Our paper is also related to the large literature on the co-existence of economic activity and conflict. Examples
include Skaperdas (1992), Hirshleifer (1995), and Grossman and Kim (1995). See Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007)
for a survey of this literature. This literature models choices of agents when agents can invest to produce as well
as increase their predatory capacity. Typically some investment occurs even though this is lower than the first
best where agents can commit not to predate. This literature assumes that all agents work as producers as well as
specialists in violence or that within a unit where agents specialise, the producers and specialists in violence have
solved their commitment problem. The key innovation that distinguishes our paper from this literature is that we
attempt to unpack how commitment between producers and specialists in violence can arise in the first place.
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(b) If the defenders win, they enter a subgame where they are the only specialists in
violence playing the same game, and producers once again make transfers and the
game restarts from stage 3.
We first model the predation stage (the last three steps in the above timing) where spe-
cialists in violence make the decision of predating or defending. This decision depends on
the transfers that are on offer from the producers. We then go back one step and derive the
transfer that producers offer each specialist in violence.
2.1 Fighting
Suppose that at this stage, p > 0 specialists in violence have decided to predate and q > 0
have decided to defend. The probability that the predators win is
p
δq + p
, (1)
whereas the probability that the defenders win is
δq
δq + p
. (2)
These probabilities are similar to those given by contest success functions commonly used in
the conflict literature, but differ from the latter since they depend solely on the number of
agents on each side of the fight and not on the effort exerted by them. Therefore, fighting
is completely costless in this formulation. Introducing an exogenous cost to conflict in this
framework is straightforward and only strengthens our result further, since the outside option
to co-operation with producers becomes less attractive (see section 2.5). On the other hand,
introducing endogenous fighting costs in our setting may affect our result in a non-trivial
way.11
This formulation implies that if all specialists in violence decide to predate, they win
costlessly with probability 1. The parameter δ indicates the degree to which the technology
of fighting favours defenders. Throughout our analysis, we make the following assumption
about the defence advantage δ.
Assumption 1. Defending specialists in violence have a combat advantage over predators,
so that δ > 1.
11The fact that the win probabilities in equations (1) and (2) depend only on the number of specialists in violence
who are predators and defenders implies there are no free-rider problems of the kind discussed by Olson (1965).
Nitzan and Ueda (2014) in their “anti-Olson theorem” show that the probability of winning is increasing in group
size as long as c′(0) = 0 and c′ is convex, where c(x) is the cost of exerting effort x. Therefore, we can think of
our formulation as arising out of a contest between predators and defenders with endogenous effort where these
conditions on marginal costs are satisfied, guaranteeing that free-rider effects are dominated by group-size effects.
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2.2 Predation vs defence
Since by this stage output is already realised, we will normalize it to 1, so that all payoffs
are fractions of total output. Consider the decision of a specialist in violence to predate or
defend when there are p predators and q defenders.
If he joins the predators, their number increases to p+ 1 so that the probability of them
winning is p+1δq+p+1 . Should they win, predators share output equally, each getting a share
1
p+1 of output. Note that this equal sharing rule is equivalent to the predators engaging
in a (costless) contest for the expropriated output, which is naturally the sole mechanism
available to them after successful predation12. Since they are all assumed to be equal, in the
equilibrium of this contest, they would each win output with equal probability. Therefore,
the expected payoff from joining p predators is
Πp+1q
def
=
1
δq + p+ 1
. (3)
Should he instead join the defenders, their number rises to q + 1 so that the probability
of the defenders winning is δ(q+1)δ(q+1)+p . After a successful defence, the remaining specialists in
violence enter a subgame where they are offered transfers by producers and then choose to
predate or defend. In that subgame, a specialist in violence has the option of predating and
getting at least the payoff from being the sole predator.13 Then, the expected payoff from
joining q defenders is at least
∆pq+1
def
=
δ(q + 1)
δ(q + 1) + p
Π1q
=
δ(q + 1)
δ(q + 1) + p
1
δq + 1
.
(4)
Given these payoffs from predation and defence, the following lemma shows that the latter
dominates the former.
Lemma 1. Iff δ > 1, ∆pq+1 ≥ Πp+1q for all p and q, with strict inequality if p > 0.
Proof. By inspection.
This lemma shows that when there is a defensive advantage, a specialist in violence strictly
prefers to join forces with defenders rather than the predators, if there are any of the latter.
This is because the payoff from defending first and predating in the subsequent subgame,
where some specialists in violence have been eliminated, is strictly greater than the payoff
from predation. This means that in every subgame, there will be at most one predator.
12Similarly, note that after successful predation there is no more room for producers to offer transfers to specialists
in violence.
13Note that for fixed p+ q, Πp+1q is increasing in p.
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2.3 Transfers
In the last stage, we saw that, from the point of view of an individual specialist in violence,
it is always better to defend than to predate if some of the other specialists in violence are
predating. But what about when all the other specialists in violence are also defending?
In that case, the transfers that the producers offer will determine the choice of whether to
predate or defend.
In our model, producers make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the specialists in violence, who
then independently decide their actions. Then, given that producers have all the bargaining
power, it follows that specialists in violence are always pushed to their outside option.14 This
means that in every subgame after a successful defence, the producers’ transfer is exactly
equal to an individual specialist in violence’s payoff from becoming the sole predator, so that
∆pq+1 as defined in (4) is the actual defence payoff, not merely its lower bound. Since this
makes specialists in violence indifferent between being sole predators and defenders we will
make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. Specialists in violence who are indifferent between predating and defending
choose defence.
We make defence the preferred option in case of indifference in order to rule out equilibria
where only one specialist in violence predates and everyone (including the producers) gets
exactly the same expected payoff as in the case where all specialists in violence accept the
producers’ offer.15 However such equilibria are purely an artifact of the producers pushing
the specialists in violence to their outside option, and disappear as soon as the latter have
some bargaining power. Given this assumption, the preceding arguments lead to the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game with s specialists
in violence consists of producers offering each specialist in violence a fraction
t(s) =
1
1 + δ(s− 1) (5)
of total output, with all specialists in violence choosing not to predate.
Proof. The proof is established by induction on the number of specialists in violence. Firstly,
note that when there is only one specialist in violence, his expected payoff from predation is
one, since that is the probability with which he can expropriate all output. Then, producers
14The results are robust to changing the bargaining power of the producers and specialists in violence as long as
the latter do not have all the bargaining power. With full bargaining power, specialists in violence make a take it
or leave it offer leaving producers with nothing, and consequently the incentive for ex-ante investment is destroyed.
15The only difference with these equilibria is that unlike the unique equilibrium in Proposition 1 with no predation,
these contain a positive probability of predation. However the expected level of expropriation is equal to the
total transfers in the no predation equilibrium and moreover the central message of the paper about decrease in
expropriation through increased competition remains a feature of these equilibria.
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can ensure that he does not predate by t = 1: this would make the specialist in violence indif-
ferent between predation and non-predation, and by Assumption 1 the specialist in violence
would not predate.
Next, suppose that we have already managed to prove that the proposition holds whenever
the number of specialists in violence is less than or equal to some number s − 1, and let us
examine whether the proposition still holds if there are s specialists in violence.
To analyse the predation and defence payoffs of an individual specialist in violence, suppose
that p ≥ 1 of the other specialists in violence have decided to predate and q ≤ s − 2 have
decided to defend. Then his payoff from joining the p other predators is
p+ 1
p+ 1 + δq
1
(p+ 1)
= Πp+1q . (6)
On the other hand, the payoff from joining the q defenders is the expected value of the
product of the probability that q + 1 defenders win against p predators and of the payoff in
the subgame where the defenders have won and there are only q + 1 remaining specialists in
violence. Since we are considering subgame-perfect equilibria we know that the payoff in that
subgame will be the Nash equilibrium of that subgame. Furthermore, we assumed that the
proposition holds in any game where the number of specialists in violence is at most s so that
the Nash equilibrium payoff in a subgame where there are only q + 1 specialist in violence is
1
1+δq . The payoff from defence is then
δ(q + 1)
p+ δ(q + 1)
1
1 + δq
= ∆pq+1 (7)
By Lemma 1, ∆pq+1 > Π
p+1
q for all values of p, with strict inequality since p ≥ 1. Therefore
a specialist in violence always strictly prefers defence to predation if there is at least one other
potential predator.
Suppose instead that, from the point of view of an individual specialist in violence all of
the other specialists in violence are defenders. Then his payoff from predation is 1δ(s−1)+1 ,
whereas that from defence is simply the transfer t. By Assumption 2, producers can ensure
that this specialist in violence does not predate by offering a transfer exactly equal to his
predation payoff. Therefore, when there are s specialists in violence, the only equilibrium is
one where producers offer t(s) = 1δ(s−1)+1 and all specialists in violence do not predate.
To reiterate, the intuition of this result is as follows. Although a larger number of predating
specialists in violence increases the probability of a successful predation, the payoff conditional
on success is weighed down by the decreased share each specialist in violence receives.16 As
16It is interesting to note that the reason why the increase in the numerator of the probability of successful
predation is exactly offset by the reduction in the share of each specialist in violence is because p enters linearly
in the numerator of the probability of successful predation defined in equation (1). Allowing for a more general
functional form f(p)δf(q)+f(p) changes the results. Typically the uniqueness of equilibrium may no longer be available
with a general f(p) as multiple stable coalitions between specialists in violence may arise.
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a result it is more attractive for a specialist in violence to stave off predation with the
expectation of the larger share he receives if the defenders win. Even a marginal defensive
advantage ensures that it is a dominant strategy for all specialists in violence to defend.17 If
all other s−1 specialists in violence are defending the payoff of a lone specialist in violence who
considers predation is Π1s−1 =
1
1+δ(s−1) . Hence when producers offer him this amount they
make him indifferent between predation and defence and given Assumption 2, he defends.
It is now possible to see why δ > 1 is foundational to our results. It ensures that potential
predators always prefer to defend in order to eliminate competitors and guarantee themselves
a higher payoff in the subsequent sub-game. There are several ways in which such a defensive
advantage could arise. For instance it could arise out of the possibility of producers helping
defending specialists in violence in the fight against the predating ones. Although in our model
producers possess no combat ability, they could still provide help to defending specialists in
violence through non-armed resistance in the form of intelligence gathering, sabotage or
strikes, etc. Such activities would be of limited use to producers in protecting themselves
from expropriation but could be a boost to a military force that can take advantage of them.
However the induction structure of the proof implies that this way of thinking about the
defensive advantage may be problematic. To see this note that producers should side with the
defenders even in the case where there is only one defender. However in this case the producers
should anticipate full predation following a successful defense and should consequently be
indifferent to helping the defender.
Another way of motivating the presence of a defensive advantage is through the idea of
social norms. In a society where the idea of protecting producers is firmly entrenched, and
a specialist in violence is a military leader who commands a military unit, we would expect
that troops would be at least marginally less likely to obey a command to predate. If this
is the case, we may think of 1δ as the proportion of a predator’s troops that stay loyal to
him. This delivers the structure we need on the probability of victory for the two sides. It
is interesting to note that it would be natural for such a social norm to arise in a society
since all agents including specialists in violence are better off with it. In the absence of such
a norm, producers would correctly anticipate full expropriation at the end of the period and
will consequently invest nothing at the start. This in turn would reduce the payoff of the
specialists in violence to zero. Hence the existence of such a norm turns out to be Pareto
efficient since it underpins the ability of specialists in violence not to fully expropriate.
Proposition 1 shows that the transfer that each specialist in violence receives is decreasing
in the number s of specialists in violence but it turns out that total transfers to all specialists
in violence are also decreasing in their number, as our next result shows.
Proposition 2. Total transfers to specialists in violence are decreasing in their number.
17Hence, the equilibrium is the same if we allow deviations by coalitions.
10
Proof. Total transfers are
st(s) =
s
1 + δ(s− 1) =
1
δ − (δ − 1)1/s. (8)
Since δ > 1, we can see that they are therefore decreasing in s.
This shows that not only is the transfer paid to an individual specialist in violence de-
creasing in s, but that the sum of transfers is also decreasing in the number of specialists
in violence. This is because, as the number of specialists in violence increases, the deviation
payoff from predation becomes worse, which in turn decreases the equilibrium transfers they
are paid. We can summarise this result as follows.
Remark 1. Expropriation is decreasing in the number of specialists in violence.
This result captures the mechanism that this paper highlights. Total expropriation tends
to decrease when power is diffuse. In particular, total expropriation decreases in the number of
specialists in violence as the balance of power between them is such that unilateral predation
becomes more and more unattractive. This result is interesting when contrasted with the
Olsonian idea that decreasing the number of specialists in violence decreases their incentives
to expropriate fully.
As we would expect, total expropriation is decreasing in the defensive advantage. The
intuition for this is straightforward. As defence becomes easier, the expected payoff from
predation decreases. Consequently specialists in violence are satisfied with a lower transfer
and the degree of expropriation the producers face goes down.
The central message of the model is that competition among specialists in violence cre-
ates a balance of power that makes predation unattractive, leading to a commitment not to
predate. The intuition behind this result is simple: the defensive advantage not only skews
the probability of combat victory towards defence, but makes it profitable to defend first and
predate later, rather than predate at the outset; defence is a way to eliminate competitors
and thus guarantee a bigger payoff for oneself, making it the dominant strategy. The inability
to commit to refrain from using co-operation with producers as a way to get rid of each other
places specialists in violence in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, which the producers can exploit to
avoid full predation.
The inability of specialists in violence to commit is a crucial issue in our paper. In modern
economies, the ability to commit to agreements arises precisely from the existence of agents
who can use their coercive power to punish those who renege on their commitments. But the
commitment not to abuse their power is not available to the very agents who perform this
enforcement function. Appealing to institutions to generate such commitment merely shifts
the burden to the higher level specialists in violence who must support such institutions. This
logic leads to an infinite regress where commitment at one level is sustained by commitment
at a higher one. We have attempted to find a solution to this problem by using a somewhat
different approach. In our model, what underlies the ability of specialists in violence to
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commit is not other institutions, but simply material forces that govern the success or failure
of an attack aimed at expropriation, in other words, forces that shape the nature of the game
that specialists in violence play.
2.4 Heterogeneity in strength
In this subsection we extend the model to allow specialists in violence to have differing
strengths. This allows us to examine how expropriation changes in response to changes in
the distribution of their strengths. In particular we find that total expropriation decreases
as the distribution of strengths becomes more equal. This strengthens our main point about
the positive impact of competition between specialists in violence.
Suppose that the specialists in violence are indexed by i, where i = 1, ..., s, and let each
of them have strength xi, which captures all factors that would contribute to increasing the
probability of winning, such as their skill, the level of training, the quality of their equipment,
or in case specialists in violence are military leaders, the number of troops they command.
Now that they differ in strength, rather than sharing output equally, each successful predator
obtains a share of output that is proportional to his strength. In parallel to the discussion
of predation in subsection 2.2, this proportional sharing rule is equivalent to the predators
engaging in a contest to win the expropriated output where each predator’s probability of
winning is proportional to his strength. Thus a specialist in violence with strength x who
successfully predated with others who have total strength P , would get a share of xx+P of
total output.
Let P and Q be the total strengths of the predators and defenders, respectively. We next
prove the counterpart to Lemma 1, showing that defence is a dominant strategy, being strictly
dominant if there is at least one predator already.
Lemma 2. Iff δ > 1, x > 0,
δ(Q+ x)
P + δ(Q+ x)
x
x+ δQ
≥ P + x
P + x+ δQ
x
x+ P
(9)
with strict inequality if P > 0.
Proof. By inspection.
We can now prove the analogue of Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game where each spe-
cialist in violence has strength xi is for producers to offer to each of them a transfer
ti =
xi
xi + δ
∑
j 6=i xj
, (10)
and for all specialists in violence to not predate.
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Proof. The proof is the same as that for Proposition 1 but using Lemma 2 to establish that
defence is a dominant strategy whenever there is at least one predator, so that producers
only need to offer to each specialist in violence their payoff from being the sole predator.
An interesting feature of the equilibrium is that payoff of each specialist in violence de-
pends not only on his strength, but also on that of all others. It is then natural to ask how the
distribution of strengths affects the total expropriation that producers face. The following
proposition shows that a more equal distribution leads to lower transfers.
Proposition 4. Suppose that specialist in violence i and j have strengths xi > xj. Then
reducing i’s strength to xi− ε and increasing j’s to xj + ε, where 0 < ε < xi− xj, will reduce
total transfers.
Proof. Since the redistribution of strength keeps the sum of i and j’s strengths constant, the
payoff to all other specialists in violence is unaffected. Therefore, it suffices to show that the
transfers to i and j, namely ti + tj , will fall. Then we need to show that
xi
xi + δxj + δ
∑
k 6=i,j xk
+
xj
xj + δxi + δ
∑
k 6=i,j xk
≥ xi − ε
xi − ε+ δ(xj + ε) + δ
∑
k 6=i,j xk
+
xj + ε
xj + ε+ δ(xi − ε) + δ
∑
k 6=i,j xk
=
xi − ε
xi + δxj + (δ − 1)ε+ δ
∑
k 6=i,j xk
+
xj + ε
xj + δxi − (δ − 1)ε+ δ
∑
k 6=i,j xk
. (11)
Letting σi = xi + δxj + δ
∑
k 6=i,j xk and σj = xj + δxi + δ
∑
k 6=i,j xk, we need to show that
xi
σi
+
xj
σj
≥ xi − ε
σi + (δ − 1)ε +
xj + ε
σj − (δ − 1)ε (12)
⇔ xiσj + xjσi
σiσj
≥ xiσj + xjσi − 2(δ − 1)ε
(
xi − xj − ε
)
σiσj + (δ − 1)2ε
(
xi − xj − ε
) , (13)
which is true if δ > 1 and 0 < ε < xi − xj .
This proposition shows that a Dalton-transfer of strength from a stronger specialist in
violence to a weaker one will reduce total transfers. As a consequence, a more equal distri-
bution of strengths yields lower total transfers, with the minimum being achieved when all
specialist in violence are homogeneous.
Remark 2. Expropriation decreases with more equal distribution of strength among specialists
in violence.
This is in line with the intuitive idea that a balance of power as arising from power being
equally spread out over a number of agents helps in preventing predation. A more even
distribution of power yields more effective competition, strengthening our main point that
competition is the force underlying the ability of specialists in violence to commit. Seen
together Remarks 1 and 2 reinforce the positive impact that competition among specialists
in violence has on investment incentives in the economy.
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2.5 Costly conflict
So far, we have analysed a model with costless conflict. In this section, we argue that the
result in Proposition 1 extends naturally to the case where conflict is costly. In particular,
the unique equilibrium where all specialists in violence defend persists. However, costs of
conflict have distributional consequences – the transfers to specialists in violence decrease,
and the producers retain a larger share of the output.
Note firstly that introducing costly conflict among successful predators in the process of
dividing up the spoils only strengthens the unique equilibrium in Proposition 1 by making
predation less attractive. Moreover, equilibrium transfers are determined by the probability
of a lone predator winning. In such a case, after successful predation, there is no further
contest to divide expropriated output because there is only one predator. Hence, costly
output sharing after successful predation does not affect equilibrium transfers.
There are two potential sources of inefficiency when conflict is triggered. First, the spe-
cialist in violence may have to exert potentially costly effort c ≥ 0 when engaging in conflict.
Second, conflict may directly lead to part of the output being destroyed, with only a portion
φ remaining.
Allowing for these, the equilibrium transfers change to
t(s;φ, c) =
φ
1 + δ(s− 1) − c. (14)
It is reasonable to think that φ depends on institutional quality. Developed countries
(low φ) typically rely on production technologies that require inputs such as capital and
a highly skilled workforce, both of which are very mobile. It seems plausible that in the
unlikely scenario that conflict among specialists in violence is triggered in such an economy,
it would lead to a large proportion of output being destroyed due to the flight of capital
and high skilled workers. On the other hand, output in under-developed countries relying on
agriculture would be less vulnerable to loss during conflict as the inputs are less mobile. In
section 3 we construct a model based on this idea that we take to the data in section 4.
3 Modeling short-run expropriation risk
In this section we take the mechanism from section 2 and embed it in a richer model with
occupational choice into specialists in violence and producers, taking into account the level of
institutional development as captured by the amount of output that remains after predation,
as in subsection 2.5. This will give us a model with richer testable implications about short-run
expropriation risk that we take to the data in section 4.
We model a one-shot game that repeats each period, where a period is defined as one year,
in line with our empirical formulation in section 4. The economy is populated with n agents,
s of whom are potential specialists in violence who have the choice of becoming specialists in
violence or producers, the remaining n− s being producers. A potential specialist in violence
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is an agent that is endowed with the characteristics, such as ruthlessness or fearlessness, that
are required to become an actual specialist in violence. The number of potential specialists
in violence s is randomly drawn at the beginning of each period such that s ≤ s ≤ n. The
number of actual specialists in violence s∗ is determined in equilibrium. All agents are risk
neutral.
Timing We make two modifications to the timing in section 2. First, there is now a stage 0
where the number s of potential specialists in violence is drawn and each potential specialist
in violence decides whether to become specialists in violence or producers. Second, we modify
stage 2 of the timing. So far we have assumed that when output is realized, producers offer a
transfer to each specialist in violence, and this fraction is determined solely by their option to
predate. Now in addition to this, we also allow the transfer to be determined competitively
by the role of specialists in violence in providing a public good.
Public good provision We enrich the model by allowing specialists in violence to per-
form a positive role in the economy in addition to the predatory role they perform in section
2. To capture this simply, we assume output f(i, s) is a function of investment i and the
number of actual specialists in violence s. In particular we assume that
f(i, s) =
iα if s ≥ s0 otherwise, (15)
where α ∈ (0, 1). This formulation implies that the socially beneficial role of specialists in
violence is performed as long as there are at least s of them in the economy. This formulation
is motivated by the idea that a certain number of specialists in violence are required for the
provision of basic public goods needed for the economy to function. Although we do not
model this explicitly, the demand for such public goods may arise from the need to both
eliminate external threats and to deter undesirable behavior within the economy, e.g., agents
reneging from contracts, theft, etc. Since specialists in violence have the capacity to exert
coercive power, they are ideally suited to perform this role. This particular formulation of
public goods simplifies the analysis but is not central to our results which would hold even
if public goods are modeled as a continuous function of the number of specialists in violence,
or if public goods entered additively in agents’ payoffs.
Payoffs Assuming that there are enough specialists in violence to ensure positive output,
and that each one of the s specialists in violence receives a fraction t of output, the payoff of
each producer is
u(st) := max
i
{(1− st) iα − i} = (1− α)(1− st) y∗(st) , (16)
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where i is the amount of investment and individual output is
y∗(st) := α
α
1−α (1− st) α1−α . (17)
On the other hand, the payoff from being one of the s specialists in violence is given by
v(s, t) := t(n− s) y∗(st) , (18)
where (n − s) y∗(st) is total output. Finally, let w(s, t) be the difference between the payoff
of a specialist in violence and a producer, that is,
w(s, t) := v(s, t)− u(st) = ((n− αs)t− (1− α)) y∗(st) (19)
and note that the payoff for specialists in violence is higher, equal to or lower than that of a
producer iff
w(s, t) T 0 ⇐⇒ t T t(s) := 1− α
n− αs , (20)
where t(s) is the transfer that equates the payoff of a specialist in violence and a producer,
which is increasing in s. This is because an increase in s decreases output both at the extensive
margin, that is through a decrease in n−s, and at the intensive margin through an increase in
the effective tax rate st. This is greater than drop in the payoff from production which only
operates through the intensive margin effect. Consequently an increase in s decreases the
relative payoff of a specialist in violence. Hence t(s) must increase to ensure that a potential
specialist in violence is indifferent between being a producer and a specialist in violence.
Transfers In section 2.5, the equilibrium transfer was determined solely by the payoff from
being the only predator, with each specialist in violence receiving
t(s;φ, c) := φ
1
1 + δ(s− 1) − c , (21)
where 1 − φ is the proportion of output that is destroyed by predation and c is the cost of
conflict, which we argued are inversely related to institutional quality.
In this section, since specialists in violence now provide a public good, we can think of
the transfer t(s), which equates the payoffs of producers and specialists in violence as the
competitive transfer for providing the service. We assume that specialists in violence always
receive at least t(s) as long as there are at least s of them to ensure positive output. Should
their number fall below s production becomes impossible, and they receive 0 transfers.
Equilibrium We define a pair s∗, t∗ of number of specialists in violence and transfers to
them to be an equilibrium if either one of the following holds:
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• w(s∗, t∗) = 0: producers and specialists in violence have equal payoffs18, so that potential
specialists in violence who have become producers do not want to switch to being actual
specialists in violence and vice-versa;
• s∗ = s and w(s, t∗) > 0: specialists in violence have strictly higher payoffs than pro-
ducers so that all potential specialists in violence wish to become actual specialists in
violence.
Note also that once the number of actual specialists in violence is decided, the game proceeds
as in section 2, so that the equilibrium transfer must be t∗ = max{t(s), t(s∗;φ, c)}.
Lastly, before characterising the equilibrium of this game, it will be helpful to define φ as
the level of institutional quality such that the predation and competitive transfers are equal
when there are s specialists in violence, i.e., t(s;φ, c) = t(s), which implies
φ :=
(
(1− α)
n− αs + c
)
(1 + δ(s− 1)) . (22)
We can now state our result.
Proposition 5. For any given c, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium with positive
output where the number of specialists in violence s∗ and transfer t∗ are given by
s∗ =
min{s, s˜(φ)} if φ > φs if φ ≤ φ and t∗ =
t(s∗;φ, c) if φ > φt(s) if φ ≤ φ , (23)
where s˜(φ) is the unique value of s that solves w(s, t(s;φ, c)) = 0.
Proof. Firstly, note that by (20), w(s, t(s)) < 0 for all s > s, so that t∗ = t(s) implies s∗ = s.
When φ ≤ φ, for any s ≥ s, t(s;φ, c) ≤ t(s;φ, c) ≤ t(s;φ, c) = t(s), where the last equality
follows from the definition of φ. Hence, in this case, t∗ = t(s) and s∗ = s.
Next, consider φ > φ. In this case, t(s;φ, c) > t(s;φ, c) = t(s), so that by (20),
w(s, t(s;φ, c)) > 0 and s cannot be the equilibrium number of specialists in violence, and
the equilibrium transfer cannot be t(s). Instead the equilibrium transfer must be given by
t(s∗;φ, c), and we need to determine s∗.
From (20), w(s, t(s;φ, c)) = 0 is equivalent to t(s;φ, c) = t(s), which has a unique solution
for s since t(s;φ, c) and t(s) are monotonically decreasing and increasing in s, and call this
solution s˜. If s˜ ≤ s, then s∗ = s˜, otherwise s∗ = s, as required.
Our result illustrates how the nature of the equilibrium varies with our measure φ of
institutional quality. At low levels of institutional quality, i.e., when φ > φ, transfers to
specialists in violence are determined by their predation payoffs, as in section 2. Their number
18Strictly speaking, s∗ defined in this way need not be an integer. This issue can be addressed by stating the
definition in terms of the largest integer not greater than s∗ and the smallest integer not less than s∗. This would
not substantially change our result and merely makes the exposition considerably more cumbersome.
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are either determined exogenously when the number of actual specialists in violence equals
the number of potential specialists in violence, that is s∗ = s, or endogenously with s∗ = s˜(φ)
so that they are indifferent between choosing to be specialists in violence or producers.
At high levels of institutional quality, i.e., when φ ≤ φ, if specialists in violence were given
transfers determined by their predation payoffs, not enough of them would choose to become
specialists in violence to provide the public good. In such cases, they are instead compensated
competitively, that is, they are given transfers that make them indifferent between choosing
to become producers instead.
Implication 1. At low levels of institutional development, the effect of exogenous increase
in the number of specialists in violence on short-run expropriation risk is negative and atten-
uating in institutional quality.
In our model, when φ > φ, and the number of specialists in violence is determined
exogenously by the number of potential specialists in violence such that s∗ = s, the short-run
risk of expropriation is given by φt(s)s. The effect of s on expropriation risk is
∂φt(s)s
∂s
= −φ δ − 1
(1 + δ(s− 1))2 < 0 (24)
We observe that the effect is negative and that the magnitude of this effect is increasing in φ.
This implies that the competition mechanism that is modeled in Proposition 1, which causes
short-run expropriation risk to decrease in s, should be supported by the data for countries
with low institutional quality.
Historically, institutions were stacked in favor of agents who controlled coercive power.
North et al. (2009) describe how institutional development over time unfolded incrementally in
a slow and often uneven process that transformed institutions that in their terminology were
“natural” or extractive, to ones that are “open access” and conducive to modern economic
activity. Our model is consistent with this since the competition mechanism from section 2
is purely of the extractive variety, and its effect on year-on-year expropriation risk is higher
for countries with low institutional quality.
Implication 2. Institutional and economic development are positively correlated.
It is possible to see that equilibrium output y(s, φ) is decreasing in φ. This is because of
the well understood channel of institutional quality having a positive effect on investment.19
Although there already exists a literature that tests this prediction, our model allows us to test
this in a unique way. In particular the link between economic and institutional development
implies that we can substitute institutional quality with economic development in Implication
1 above and still find a robust empirical relationship.
19See Besley and Ghatak (2010) for an overview of links between expropriation and economic outcomes.
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4 Empirics
In this section we test Implications 1 and 2 from the previous section. The empirical analysis
is based on panel data from the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers dataset
compiled by the US Department of State.20 The data comprises 168 countries over an 11
year period from 1995 to 2005. This contains data on our main explanatory variable, the
number of active troops, together with data on military and government expenditure in 2005
US dollars, which we use as controls.
The empirical analogue of the number of specialists in violence is the number of troops.
This is appropriate if we believe that a soldier can unilaterally decide whether to defend
producers or to predate. However if a soldier simply obeys the command of a military leader,
then the ideal measure for the number of specialists in violence is the number of military
leaders. Since we lack data on the number of military leaders, we will use the number of
troops as the regressor for our empirical analysis. In section 4.4 we describe the assumptions
under which this is a valid proxy for the case when specialists in violence are military leaders
and not soldiers.
We measure the risk of expropriation, using the Investment Profile component of the
Country Risk measure compiled by Political Risk Services for their International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG). The Investment Profile index in the ICRG dataset has been widely used
as a measure of the risk of expropriation starting with Knack and Keefer (1995). As noted by
Acemoglu et al. (2001), although the variable is designed to capture the risk of expropriation
for foreign investment, the correlation with the risk of expropriation for domestic investment
is likely to be high. This variable measures the risk of expropriation on a scale from 0 to
12, with a higher score indicating a lower risk. Descriptive statistics for this and all other
variables we use are reported in table 1.
4.1 Baseline results
Our model predicts a negative causal relationship between the number of specialists in violence
and the risk of expropriation that is decreasing in magnitude with higher institutional quality.
In practice there are several other factors that affect the strength of property rights in a
country that are likely to be conflated with the mechanism we are interested in testing. For
instance the literature points to “deep” structural ones such as factor endowments of the
country (Engerman and Sokoloff (2000)), legal origins (Djankov et al. (2003)), and colonial
history (Acemoglu et al. (2001)). These could be potential sources of bias in our results. To
account for them we test our model in a panel setting with country fixed effects. This absorbs
the effect of time invariant factors and allows us to analyze whether the mechanism we model
can explain the short-run within-country variation in the strength of property rights. We
20The data is available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2005/index.htm
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start with the following simple specification
yit = αi + βt + γ lnAT it +X
′
itη + εit , (25)
which is a restricted version of (26) where λ is assumed to be zero. Here, yit is a measure
of short-run protection from expropriation21, αi and βt are country and time fixed effects,
AT it is the number of active troops, and Xit is a vector of time-varying country-level controls
that include per capita income, government and military spending, population, indices for
the rule of law and levels of internal and external conflict. Table 2 reports the results of this
regression. We observe that the estimate of γ is close to zero and statistically insignificant in
all specifications.
However, given Implication 1, we expect competition among specialists in violence to
have a different effect at different levels of development, with the relationship being stronger
for countries with lower institutional quality. Therefore to test the relationship between the
strength of property rights and the number of specialists in violence we propose the following
specification:
yit = αi + βt + γ lnAT it + λ(1− φi) · lnAT it +X ′itη + εit , (26)
where 1− φi is institutional quality in country i. Given Implication 1, we expect the sign on
γ to be positive and λ to be negative. Any other result, such as positive γ and λ implying
that the positive effect of specialists in violence becomes stronger with development, would
lead us to conclude that there is little support for our model in the data. To test this, we
regress the specification in (26) where we proxy for 1− φi by the mean of the Revised Polity
IV variable for the period between 1990-1994. This measures the average constraint faced by
the executive within a country.
In line with our model in section 3 we prefer to use a time invariant φi since we wish to
capture long run “deep” institutional quality through this variable. As we show in section 4.4,
the use of time-invariant measure of development also allows us to address the potential
measurement error induced by the use of the number armed forces as a proxy for specialists
in violence. Moreover taking the average between 1990-94, before our sample begins, implies
that this variable is less likely to be endogenously determined with short-run fluctuations in
expropriation risk between 1995-2005. None the less in section 4.2 we show that our empirical
results are robust to letting φi vary over time. Finally the use of mean Polity IV averaged over
five years before 1995, which is the starting point for the rest of our sample, helps mitigate
the concern that this variable is in fact affected by short-run changes in expropriation risk,
21Our paper is not the first paper to exploit the short-run variation in institutions using the ICRG dataset Busse
and Hefeker (2007) also use a fixed effects specification to estimate the effect of short-run institutional fluctuations
on foreign direct investment. There are two key differences, first in this paper these short-run fluctuations are the
dependent variable, and second we only use the investment profile index in the ICRG dataset (rather than the
aggregate of all ICRG components) since it closely matches our model. The robustness of our results to using the
aggregate ICRG index over all components is shown in table 6.
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which is our dependent variable. We discuss the concern of endogeniety in more detail in
section 4.5.
Note that in the model from section 3, the equilibrium number of specialists in violence
is either equal to the number of potential specialists in violence s, which is exogenous, or
s˜(φ). Since institutional quality 1− φ is assumed to be time invariant within a country, the
effect of s˜(φ) on expropriation risk is absorbed in the country fixed effects and this allows us
to empirically focus on the competition effect by observing the changes in the expropriation
risk induced by exogenous variation in s.
Table 3 reports the results. Although the estimate of γ is positive and significant, this
in itself is not confirmation of our hypothesis because the interaction term implies that the
marginal effect γ+λ ·PolityIV i is a function of the level of average institutional development.
In particular, γ is the effect when average Polity IV variable is zero, whereas a negative λ
indicates that this effect is declining in institutional development.
Assuming for the sake of illustration that these effects are causal, the estimates suggest
that in a country like Syria that has a mean Polity IV score of −9 for the period 1990–5
(in the lowest decile), a one percent fall in the number of troops would decrease protection
against expropriation by (0.638 − 0.229 × −9)/100 = 0.027 points. To put this number in
perspective, between the years 2003 and 2004, Syrian armed forces decreased in size from
325,000 to 315,000, a 3% decrease. Our estimates predict a corresponding fall in protection
against expropriation by 0.081 points, which accounts for about one fifth of the actual fall of
0.375.
Figure 1 illustrates the marginal effect22 of an increase in the log of the number of troops at
all Polity IV percentiles in the sample, with 90%, 95% and 99% confidence intervals computed
using the method explained in appendix B.
The effect thresholds in each specification indicate the percentile of average income below
which the estimated marginal effect γˆ + λˆ · lnPolityIV i is positive and significant at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level. For instance, the number 0.423 for the 5% effect threshold in column (6)
indicates that this effect is significant at the 5% level for countries that are below the 42.3
percentile of the Polity IV distribution. Looking at these numbers across all specifications we
can say that the competition effect seems to be significant for countries that are below the
40th percentile of the Polity IV distribution.
Column (1) from table 3 reports the results of the regression where we only control for
per-capita income and government spending. Since we control for both country and time
fixed effects in all our specifications, any source of bias must arise from factors that vary over
time within a country.
In contrast to the story captured in the model in section 3, it is possible that the size of
the army is instead determined in a constrained optimization problem for the state. As a
result, the observed variation in the size of the armed forces could reflect exogenous shocks to
the state’s constraints. The government’s legal taxation capacity could be such a constraint,
22Note that although the marginal effect is linear in Polity IV, it is not linear in the corresponding percentiles.
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of Active Troops on Expropriation
Risk against percentiles of Mean Polity IV
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and one that might be negatively correlated with the short-run risk of expropriation (see for
example Besley and Persson (2010)). To address this we control for government spending in
column (1) and military spending in column (2). In section 4.2 we make more attempts to
address this concern.
In our model we assume that producers make take it or leave it offers to the specialists
in violence which implies that producers have all the bargaining power. If we relax this
assumption, the risk of expropriation would vary with changes in the bargaining power. Our
estimates may be biased if the variation in the bargaining power within a country is correlated
with the number of troops. To address this concern, in column (2) we control for military
expenditure and in column (3) an index that measures the influence of military in politics
with the hope that these capture changes in the bargaining power of the military relative to
the producers. This is consistent with Bove and Nistico` (2014b) who argue that the presence
of military in politics is closely related to the civilian-military relationship.
Another concern is that the risk of expropriation and the number of troops could be
correlated with factors such as the presence of internal and external conflict. It is reasonable
to assume that the presence of fewer troops may lead to an inadequate response to conflict
and this could have an impact on the risk of expropriation. To address this concern we include
two indices in column (5) that attempt to capture the level of internal and external conflict
each year within a country. Another related concern is that the presence of more troops could
affect the risk of expropriation through better provision of law and order and lower crime. To
address this we control for an index that captures the law and order situation in a country
in a given year. The effect thresholds remain stable in all specifications.
So far we have used mean Polity IV as a proxy for 1 − φi. However given Implication 2
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of the model, our results should go through when we use economic development instead of
institutional development as the interacting variable. In particular we use the mean of the
log of mean GDP between 1990-94. Figure 2 plots the marginal effect for the regression in
column (6). The effects thresholds and our estimates of γ and λ remain stable and significant
across these specifications.
Figure 2: Marginal effect of Active Troops on Expropriation
Risk against percentiles of Mean GDP per capita
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Inspecting figures 1 and 2 we observe that the marginal effect of the number of troops
is negative and significant for countries at the top of the distribution of institutional and
economic development. This is inconsistent with our model which predicts that the marginal
effect should be effectively zero for institutionally and economically developed countries. The
negative effect at the top of the distributions in figures 1 and 2 may arise because the in-
teraction term forces the marginal effect of troops to be linear in the level of development.
On the other hand the negative effect may be an empirical feature for developed countries,
a feature that is inconsistent with our model in section 3. To investigate this further we test
the following specification
yit = αi + βt + γD(φ)i · lnAT it + λ(1−D(φ)i) · lnAT it +X ′itη + εit , (27)
whereD(φ)i is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for countries with low institutional quality
and 0 otherwise. Since we use PolityIV i as our proxy for 1− φi, the dummy variable D(φ)i
takes value 1 for countries with PolityIV i below a certain threshold and 0 for countries above
the threshold. To conclude that there is support for Implication 1 we should observe that
the estimate for γ is positive and significant and the estimate for λ is insignificant. This
will allow us to conclude that the competition effect we model applies to countries with low
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institutional quality and is non-existent for countries with high institutional quality.
Table 5 reports the results from regressing this specification. Since we do not observe the
value of φ, we try different thresholds. In columns (1) – (6) we use −5, −4, −3, −2, −1, and
0 as the thresholds for PolityIV i below which the dummy variable D(φ)i takes value 1. In
confirmation of our model we find that across all specifications the estimates for γ are positive
and significant and the estimates for λ are insignificant indicating that the competition effect
is relevant for countries with low institutional quality and the number of troops does not
affect expropriation risk for countries with high institutional quality. This indicates that we
can ignore the significant negative effect we observe for developed countries in figures 1 and 2
which appears to be an artifact of the linear structure imposed on the marginal effect by the
interaction term in equation (26).
4.2 Robustness checks
The results from tables 3 and 4 indicate that the effect of competition within the military is
consistent with the data for countries at a lower level of institutional and economic develop-
ment. Polity IV and GDP per capita averaged over 1990–1994 are our preferred proxies for a
few reasons. Averaging over from 1990–1994, which is a period before our sample begins, is
likely to ease concerns about the endogeneity of these measures. At the same time, since this
time period is contiguous to our sample period (1995–2005), the measures would accurately
capture the levels of economic and institutional development in this period. Moreover, aver-
aging over a five year period implies that the resulting measures are unlikely to be affected
by short-run macroeconomic factors within a country. Finally, as we will show in section 4.4,
since this measure does not vary over time within a country, it allows us to rule out certain
sources of measurement error.
None the less in the first four columns of table 6 we use other proxies for the level of de-
velopment to see whether our results are robust to alternative formulations of the interaction
term. Column (1) reports the results when we interact the number of troops with GDP per
capita averaged over our sample period of 1995–2005. Similarly, column (2) reports the re-
sults when interact the number of troops with mean Polity IV averaged over 1995–2005. Once
again, the effect thresholds indicate that the competition is significant for a large proportion
of countries. In column (3) we interact the number of troops with a dummy for whether the
country is a member of the OECD. Note that since OECD membership is a binary variable,
the coefficient of active troops captures the competition effect for non-OECD countries, which
we find to be significant.23
So far we have used the Investment Profile component from the ICRG as our dependent
variable. In columns (4) and (5) of table 6 we use the aggregate ICRG Country Risk index24
23Consequently, unlike the other regressions, there is no corresponding effect threshold to be reported in column (3)
of table 6.
24The ICRG Country Risk index is composed of twelve subcomponents. In addition to Investment Profile which
measures the risk of expropriation, there is Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Internal Conflict,
24
to check whether our results are robust to alternative measures of the risk of expropriation.
Although Investment Profile is the most accurate and appropriate measure of the risk of
expropriation, the effect thresholds in the last two columns of table 6 show that our results
still hold when we use the more general risk measure. Note that since Military in Politics,
Internal and External Conflict, and Law and Order are subcomponents of this index we
cannot control for these independently.
The current empirical strategy tries to overcome the concern about state capacity being
correlated with the number of troops to some extent by controlling for the government’s
budget constraint in the form of government and military spending. However it is still possible
that the budget constraint affects the short-run risk of expropriation through its interaction
with the size of the armed forces. If this is true, the interaction between the number of
active troops and institutional quality may be proxying for omitted variables such as the
effect of the interaction of armed forces with government spending or the effect of armed
forces with military spending. To address this we include these additional interactions in
our specification. We find that the estimates for γ and λ are unchanged. These results are
reported in table 8.
Another concern is that each country has a separate trajectory along which short-run
expropriation risk evolves over time. If these country specific variations in the trends of
short-run expropriation risk are correlated with the interaction between the size of the armed
forces and institutional quality, our results would be biased. In an attempt to address this
concern we include country specific linear time trends in our model. Table 9 shows that the
results remain robust to their introduction.
4.3 Coup-proofing and counterbalancing
Belkin and Schofer (2005) and Belkin (2012) argue that high coup risk tends to prompt leaders
to divide their forces into rival organizations that check and balance each other. This is closely
related to our argument but suggests that changes to the number of rival organizations are
strategically engineered by leaders to reduce the risk of being overthrown.
To address this issue, we control for different measures of coup-proofing in our regressions
interacting them with mean Polity IV. These results are reported in table 7. Column (1)
is our main specification from equation (26) that is included for comparison. In column (2)
we control for the ratio of paramilitary to total (regular and paramilitary) military forces
and its interaction. This is the measure used by Belkin and Schofer (2005) as one of their
proxies for counterbalancing25. Another measure for counterbalancing in the literature was
External Conflict, Corruption, Military in Politics, Religion in Politics, Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic
Accountability, and Bureaucracy Quality. The first six of these are scored between 0-12 and the last six between
0-6 with a higher score indicating a more conducive investment environment. As a result the aggregate index takes
values between 0-100. See the summary statistics in table 1 for more details.
25The other proxy they use is the number of military organisations. We also control for this using the Pilster and
Bo¨hmelt (2011) measure of the effective number of military organisations which is a refinement of the Belkin and
Schofer (2005) measure.
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constructed by Pilster and Bo¨hmelt (2011), and Pilster and Bo¨hmelt (2012). They measure
the effective number of ground combat-capable military organisations as 1∑
j s
2
jit
, where sjit
is the personnel share of military or paramilitary organization j in country i in year t. In
column (3) we include this measure and its interaction, and in column (4) we include both
measures and their interactions. We find that our results remain robust to their inclusion.
In fact, controlling for the two proxies in column (4) appears to strengthen our coefficient
estimates.
Moreover, the literature on counterbalancing offers an alternative explanation of our re-
sults. This literature argues that incumbents in countries with low institutional development
may coup-proof themselves through higher military spending. Bove and Nistico` (2014a)
present evidence that suggests that the threat of a coup may lead to an increase in military
spending as incumbents attempt to counterbalance military actors through diverting more
resources both to suppress and placate them. Since it is reasonable to assume that the threat
of a coup affects the risk of expropriation, and military spending may be correlated with
the size of the armed forces, our estimates may be biased. Although we control for mili-
tary spending in our regressions, this doesn’t address the possibility of the marginal effect of
military spending being different at different levels of institutional development.
To address this issue, we regress our specification controlling for military spending and
its interaction with mean Polity IV. Controlling for the interaction helps us rule out the
possibility that our interaction of number of troops with mean Polity IV is actually absorbing
the effect of counterbalancing at different levels of institutional development on expropriation
risk. The results of this regression presented in column (2) of table 8 indicate that our
estimates remain robust to this inclusion.
4.4 Proxying for military leaders
Our use of the number of troops as the empirical counterpart to specialists in violence in our
model is based on the premise that each soldier unilaterally decides whether to predate or
defend. If instead this decision is made by a military leader, and individual soldiers simply
obey the command to predate or defend, then the use of this measure may be questionable.
Who should be considered a military leader depends on the structure of the military within
each country. In a military where the chain of command is weak, it may be appropriate to
consider a lieutenant controlling a platoon consisting of a few soldiers as a military leader.
On the other hand, in a military where the chain of command is firmly entrenched, a military
leader could be a general controlling an army command consisting of thousands of soldiers. If
the number of military leaders is the correct empirical analogue for the specialists in violence
in our model then using the number of troops as our explanatory variable may be problematic.
In what follows we show that the number of troops is still a valid proxy as long as the ratio
of military leaders to active troops remains constant within a country, that is, as long as the
structure of military leadership within a country remains the same over time.
To see that the proxy works under this assumption, let θi be the time invariant ratio of
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military leaders to active troops in country i. The number of military leaders in country i
at time t is simply sit = θi ·AT it. Using this as the regressor, the regression specification we
proposed in equation (26) modifies to
yit = αi + βt + γ ln(θi ·AT it) + λ(1− φi) · ln(θi ·AT it) +X ′itη + εit.
= αi + βt + (γ + λ(1− φi)) ln θi + γ lnAT it + λ(1− φi) · lnAT it +X ′itη + εit.
Since the term (γ + λ(1− φi)) ln θi varies across countries but is constant over time within a
country, it is absorbed by the country fixed effects and the estimates for γ and λ, when we
use the log of active troops as our regressor, are consistent. Note that for this to be true,
(1 − φi), which represents the level of institutional development in country i, must be time
invariant. This is why we use the mean Polity IV during the five years preceding the sample
period as our proxy for the level of institutional development. This argument applies mutatis
mutandis to the regressions where we use the average of GDP as our proxy for the level of
economic development.
An alternative proxy for the number of specialists in violence is the effective number of
military organisations constructed by Pilster and Bo¨hmelt (2011), as discussed in section 4.3.
In column (3) of table 7, we run a regression using both our measure and this proxy and
find that while the coefficients for our proxy (the number of troops) remain significant, the
coefficients for Pilster and Bo¨hmelt (2011)’s proxy (the effective number of organisations) are
insignificant and close to zero. This may be driven by the fact that the Pilster and Bo¨hmelt
(2011) measure captures changes in the effective number of specialists in violence at a very
high level in the military hierarchy, whereas expropriation risk may be affected by changes
in the number of lower level specialists in violence. As shown above, our proxy allows us to
remain agnostic about this issue as long as the structure of the military within a country
stays constant within a country during our sample period.
If the ratio of active troops to military leaders is not constant within a country, then
this may cause our explanatory variables to be measured incorrectly causing the estimates to
be biased. The presence of the interaction term implies that the measurement error that is
induced is not of the classical variety. Consequently the direction of bias is difficult to predict
analytically.
In an attempt to address this concern we also ran all our regressions omitting all countries
that underwent a fundamental polity change during the sample period, as recorded in the
Polity IV dataset. In particular, we excluded countries that experienced periods of foreign
occupation, collapse of central political authority or political transition during which new
institutions were planned, legally constituted, and put into effect.26 This is because during
such periods it is likely that there were structural changes in military leadership, which could
26The Polity IV variable records these transitions as “Interruption Periods”, “Interregnum Periods” and “Tran-
sition Periods”, respectively. The countries that were excluded are Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Burundi, Democratic Repuglic of Congo, Croatia, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Nigeria, Peru, Sierra Leone, Somalia.
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lead to changes in the ratio of troops to military leaders. Excluding these countries did not
change our results.27
To ensure that our results are not driven by measurement error in the number of troops,
we regress our main specification in (26) using data on the number of troops from the Military
Balance rather than the US State Department data. Column (6) in table 7 reports the results
of this regression and indicates that our results are unaffected by this change.
4.5 Endogeneity
A concern about the results we have presented so far is that the risk of expropriation is
simultaneously determined along with our explanatory variables. The use of mean levels
of development from 1990 to 1994, i.e., before our sample period, mitigates this concern.
However, since the controls remain necessarily contemporaneous, their endogeneity could
still be an issue. Although we attempt to address this concern in this section, we should
point out that it is difficult to make a water-tight case for the variation in our explanatory
variables being completely exogenous. Consequently our empirical results should be seen
more as robust correlations that indicate that the mechanism we model is consistent with the
data.
To address the concern that contemporaneous values of our explanatory variables are likely
to be simultaneously determined with the risk of expropriation, we run the specification in
equation (26) where each regressor is instrumented by the lags of all. Table 10 reports the
results. As shown by the Cragg-Donald F -statistic reported in table 10, the first stage is
significant at the 0.1% level for all specifications. We can see that the point estimates of
the IV regressions are very close to the OLS regressions with controls. Moreover the effect
thresholds indicate that the results of the instrumental variable regression follow the same
pattern as before. The marginal effect and its confidence intervals from column (6) presented
in figure 3 confirm this.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a model that attempts to explain how agents with control over coercive
power can commit not to expropriate from producers. The insight that we formalise here is
that this form of commitment should not be seen as an additional strategy that may or may
not be available to specialists in violence as a result of exogenous institutional arrangements.
Instead, we have argued that commitment should be seen as a feature of an equilibrium arising
in a game played between more than one specialist in violence. The model predicts that the
equilibrium rate of expropriation is decreasing in the number of specialists in violence and
also as the distribution of their strengths becomes less heterogeneous. These predictions are
in line with the notion that creating a balance between more than one centers of power leads
27The results of these additional regressions are available on request.
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of Active Troops on Expropriation
Risk against percentiles of Mean GDP per capita estimated
using Instrumental Variables
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to checks and balances against abuse of power. This mechanism supplies an alternative to
the Olsonian view that concentration of power in the hands of a few leads to reduction in
expropriation.
Embedding this mechanism in a richer model with occupational choice we find that this
competition effect on short-run expropriation risk attenuates in institutional quality as costs
of predation increase. We have attempted to test this prediction using a cross-country panel
dataset. We find that increasing the number of specialists in violence is associated with a
reduction in the short-run risk of expropriation, and this effect is strongest for countries with
low long run institutional quality and low economic development. This indicates that the
link between short-run expropriation risk and the power of agents who control the means
of coercion is more salient at lower levels of institutional and economic development. Our
results suggest that in addition to the long run component of institutions there may also be
a short-run component that fluctuates with the changes in the degree of competition among
agents who underpin these institutions through the control of coercive power.
A Case Studies
A.1 Consuls in the Roman Republic
In this section we examine a particular institutional arrangement from ancient Rome that
resonates quite cleanly with the mechanics of our baseline model. Consuls were the military
and civil heads of the state during the Roman republic. The fasti consulares, a listing of
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the names and tenure of consuls, dates its first entry to 509 BC. The time period that fits
our model most closely is from 509 BC when the office was established to around 89 BC.28
Although the office of the two consuls persisted well after the establishment of imperial rule
in Rome, the concentration of the imperium in two consuls, that is their status as the joint
heads of the executive, diminished gradually once Sulla assumed dictatorial control in 89 BC.
This decline continued under the appointment of Julius Caesar as a perpetual dictator in 44
BC and thereafter under the establishment of imperial rule under Augustus in 27 BC.
Two consuls were elected every year and jointly held the imperium. Any decision made
by a consul, such as a declaration of war, was subject to veto by the other consul. As the
military heads, consuls were expected to lead Roman armies in the event of a war. In case
both consuls were in the battlefield at the same time, they would share the command of the
army, alternating as the head on a day to day basis. The election of the consuls was held
by an assembly of soldiers known as the centuria.29 The fact that consuls were elected from
within the military and by the military confirms the primacy of their role as the heads of
military. Indeed, their roles as the civilian heads can be seen as arising from the control they
wielded over the military. It is therefore appropriate to think of them as analogous to the
specialists in violence in the model.
The crucial assumption that we make in the model is δ > 1. This ensures that when the
specialists in violence are evenly divided on both sides in a battle, the side supporting the
producers has at least a marginal advantage. This assumption seems valid in this setting.
During this period in Roman history, a potential soldier needed to prove ownership of a
certain amount of property to be eligible for recruitment in the military. This meant that
the soldiers tended to have close family who were typically engaged in productive activities
such as agriculture. Consequently, if the two consuls disagreed on an order to predate, the
military was at least marginally more likely to obey the order for protection of the producers
over an order for predation. Knowing this both consuls would have preferred protecting the
producers leading to the Prisoner’s Dilemma that we highlight. It is interesting to note that
the property requirement for recruitment into the army was finally relaxed in 107 BC. This
was followed closely by the transition of the republic into a dictatorship first under Sulla in
89 BC followed later by Julius Caesar and eventually the establishment of a monarchy under
Augustus in 27 BC.
This institutional arrangement points to the belief that two military heads would effec-
28A consul’s power was superseded only in case of military emergency when a dictator was appointed. The
instances of appointment of a dictator were few and short lived in this period. The exception to the rule of two
consuls was the period of 426-367 BC which is known as ‘the conflict of the orders’ when consular power was often
shared between three or more military tribunes. This does not affect our story since the results of our model are
preserved as long as the number of specialists in violence is strictly greater than 1. We have relied on Hornblower
and Spawforth (2003) as a reference for the historical material used in this case study.
29The assembly had 193 voting units, each unit representing a century, that is a group of one hundred soldiers.
The assembly was composed of 18 centuries of equites that is the cavalry, 170 centuries of pedites that is the infantry
and 5 centuries of non-combatants such as the horn blowers, artisans, etc. The voting order was the equites first
followed by the pedites and lastly the non-combatants. See Taylor (2003) for a detailed exposition of the voting
procedure in the centuria.
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tively balance each other out. Since together they enjoyed absolute power, there was nothing
preventing them from colluding with each other, other than the architecture of the game itself.
The possibility of collusion can arise either through infinite repetition of the one shot game or
through the possibility of contracting. It is possible to identify the institutional features that
precluded these. Yearly elections ensured a finite time horizon for the consuls. Consuls were
barred from seeking re-elections immediately after serving a year in office. Usually a period
of ten years was expected before they could seek the office again. This term limit preserved
the one-shot nature of the game. Second, there was no possibility of contracting since there
was no higher authority than the consuls that could enforce any such contract. It appears
that the consuls were locked in a game where the unique equilibrium was that they did not
predate.
A.2 Egypt and India
In this section we look at two examples, one from Eqypt and the other from India, that
appear to be consistent with the mechanism in our model.
The recent history of Egypt under Mubarak provides an interesting example highlighting
how the mechanics of our model may have been at play there. Our model predicts that
competition within the army would reduce the risk of expropriation for countries with low
level of institutional development. Egypt in our sample period has a mean Polity score of -7,
indicating that the competition effect should apply there. Consequently we would expect the
Egyptian political elite to be attentive to the degree of competition within the military.
It seems that this was indeed the case. Blair and Warrell (2011) reported that, “Far
from being a monolithic entity, the notoriously opaque army is described as being riven
by factionalism and mistrust, with Hosni Mubarak, president, acting to contain the power
of individual generals.” Quoting from the WikiLeaks cables, it notes that “Mubarak has no
single confidante or adviser who can truly speak for him and he has prevented any of his main
advisers from operating outside their strictly circumscribed spheres of power”. The case of
Egypt towards the end of Mubarak’s rule suggests that he was clearly aware that increasing
competition within the military, by factionalising it, was a way to consolidate his own power.
This idea is consistent with our model, which showcases how increasing the numbers and
homogenising the strength of military leaders would be an effective way of reducing their
strength.
Similarly, Pilster et al. (2014) argue that “more differentiated security forces, that is,
forces that are composed of a higher number of independent paramilitary and military or-
ganizations, are likely to act as a restraint factor in the process leading to state-sponsored
mass-killings.” Their argument is very similar to ours, other than the fact that the dependent
variable they analyse is genocides. They present the case of India as an example, arguing that
although India has faced several episodes of insurgent threats since the 1950s, Indian security
forces have been more restrained than their South-Asian counterparts, as seen the absence
of large-scale mass killings of civilians. They argue that “one reason behind this is likely to
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be that the Indian security force structure is strongly differentiated, that is, composed of a
high number of different paramilitary and regular military organizations. In fact, India has
invested in the continuous expansion of multiple paramilitary security forces specializing in
various domestic security and counterinsurgency functions since the 1950s.”
This case study is consistent with our model in that it suggests that competition within
specialists in violence is an effective way of containing undesirable outcomes. In this paper
we have focused on the risk of expropriation, but the empirical results in Pilster et al. (2014)
suggest that exploring how other outcomes are affected by the same underlying mechanism
may be an interesting avenue for future work.
B Calculation of marginal effects
Ignoring country and time subscripts, the estimated marginal effect of ln s on the risk of
expropriation in our main specification (26) is given by
φ(W )
def
= γˆ + λˆW , (28)
where γˆ and λˆ are the estimators of γ and λ, respectively, and W is the level of development,
e.g., mean GDP per capita (Table 4) or mean Polity IV (Table 3), which is interacted with s.
Let X be the matrix of all regressors, including W . Then, the variance of φ conditional on
X is
Var(φ(W )|X) = Var(γˆ|X) + 2W Cov(γˆ, λˆ|X) +W 2Var(λˆ|X) , (29)
so that the asymptotic confidence interval for φ(W ) is given by
γˆ + λˆW ± z
√
σˆ2γ + 2Wσˆγ,λ +W
2σˆ2λ , (30)
where z is the appropriate normal critical value, and σˆ2γ , σˆγ,λ and σˆ
2
λ are the estimates of
Var(γˆ|X), Cov(γˆ, λˆ|X) and Var(λˆ|X), respectively. Figures 2, 1 and 3 are then drawn by
computing these confidence intervals against percentiles of W using the critical values of z at
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels.
In order to find the value ofW at which the lower bound of the confidence interval is zero,
we set equation (30) equal to zero and solve
γˆ + λˆW − z
√
σˆ2γ + 2Wσˆγ,λ +W
2σˆ2λ = 0 (31)
⇐⇒ (λˆ2 − z2σˆ2λ)W 2 + 2(γˆλˆ− z2σˆγ,λ)W + (γˆ2 − z2σˆ2γ) = 0 (32)
for W , being careful to pick the appropriate solution through inspection of the graph of
marginal effects with respect to W . The effect thresholds reported in Tables 4 to 10 are then
computed by finding the percentiles of W corresponding to the solutions for the 10%, 5% and
1% significance levels.
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C Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
ICRG Investment Profile 7.797 2.402 0 12 1443
ICRG Country Risk 67.337 13.641 22.458 96.083 1443
Log Active Troops 3.511 1.696 0 7.983 1754
Log GDP per capita in 2005 US dollars 7.797 1.651 4.413 11.296 1787
Log Population 2.142 1.639 -2.303 7.178 1815
Log Government Spending in 2005 US dollars 8.579 2.236 3.367 14.79 1745
Log Military Spending in 2005 US dollar 6.088 2.337 0 13.128 1735
ICRG Military in Politics 10.200 1.639 2.125 12 1443
ICRG Internal Conflict 3.828 1.738 0 6 1443
ICRG External Conflict 3.809 1.820 0 6 1443
ICRG Law and Order 4.179 1.367 0 6 1443
Revised Combined Polity IV score (POLITY2) 2.843 6.704 -10 10 1698
POLITY2 and ICRG variables are indices
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